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Abstract 
Behavioral (e.g. consumption) patterns of boundedly rational agents can lead these agents into 
learning dynamics that appear to be “wasteful” in terms of well-being or welfare. Within settings 
displaying preference endogeneity, it is however still unclear how to conceptualize well-being. 
This paper contributes to the discussion by suggesting a formal model of preference learning that 
can inform the construction of alternative notions of dynamic well-being. Based on the 
assumption that interacting agents are subject to two biases that make them systematically prefer 
some cultural variants over others, a procedural notion of well-being can be developed, based on 
the idea that policy should identify and confine conditions that generate dynamic instability in 
preference trajectories. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Behavioral economics has reached a state where its methodology and key insights are 
acknowledged even by the mainstream of economics. Despite this success, it is still largely 
unclear whether and in which sense these insights translate into viable policy implications. This 
is particularly puzzling in light of the fact that there is a variety of policy issues that only become 
“visible” through the lens of psychologically informed theorizing: consider the problems related 
to overborrowing (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, ch. 8), obesity (Anand and Gray, 2009), gambling 
(Benjamin and Laibson, 2003), the perverse effects of the welfare state (Beaulier and Caplan, 
2007), and status races (Frank, 2008), to name just a few. In all these case, individual preferences 
seem to depart, in a systematic way, from what is in the individual’s own “best interests”, thereby 
generating predictable ex post regret. In order to improve policy advice in these fields, behavioral 
economics requires not only instrumental knowledge about means-ends-relationships, but also 
standards of well-being or welfare.1 Unfortunately, the standard concepts of Paretian welfare 
economics cannot be used, since there well-being is ultimately defined as the satisfaction of 
“given” and perfectly consistent (“rational”) preferences.2 In contrast, behavioral economics 
typically takes preferences to be endogenous and prone to inconsistency (causing “mistakes”). 
While the search for alternative notions of welfare is well under way, it has so far failed to come 
up with convincing results (Loewenstein and Haisley, 2008), thereby limiting the practical 
relevance of behavioral economics. 
The present paper suggests a way out of this deadlock, focusing on the specific case of 
status-oriented consumption and interdependent, dynamic status races. Inspired by Veblen 
(1898), there is a growing literature on the motivation of status consumption (Johansson-Stenman 
and Martinsson, 2006; Rege, 2008; De Fraja, 2009), the behavioral dynamics it generates (e.g. 
Friedman and Ostrov, 2008), and possible implications for, e.g., utility levels (Hopkins and 
Kornienko, 2004), social capital (Eaton and Eswaran, 2009), tax policy (Ng, 1987a; Ireland, 
2001; Frank, 2008) and the provision of public goods (Ng, 1987b).3 We contribute to this 
literature by arguing that in order to be consistent, policy implications with respect to status races 
have to be based on a notion of welfare that can be applied in a “behavioral”, dynamic world 
                                                 
1 These terms will be used interchangeably in the following. 
2 This problem has apparently been neglected by the early literature on behavioral economics (see Berg, 2003). 
3 Seminal contributions are Duesenberry (1949, ch. 3), Hirsch (1976) and Frank (1999). 
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3 
where preferences change over time and tend to be inconsistent. Standard Paretian concepts of 
welfare cannot do the job. However, those non-standard notions of welfare that have so far been 
proposed in the literature – such as “idealized choice”, happiness, capability and “opportunity” – 
suffer from shortcomings as well. Two issues are particularly important: first, most of these 
notions (“opportunity” being the exception) are outcome-oriented rather than focused on the 
process of preference development. Second, all of them are insufficiently grounded in empirical 
evidence on human choice in a “behavioral” world of inconsistent and variable preferences. Our 
argument starts from the intuition that in such a world, policy should follow procedural rather 
than static concepts and focus on the ability of agents to engage in the ongoing instrumentally 
effective learning of new wants and preferences. Put differently, the market’s institutional 
framework should give agents maximum freedom to try out new preferences. At the same time, 
however, it should make sure that systematic (hence foreseeable) self-defeating preference 
dynamics are avoided. If these two goals conflict, the first goal should take precedence, which 
calls for the use of freedom-preserving instruments such as “nudges” (Thaler and Sunstein, 
2008). 
In order to identify self-defeating preference dynamics, we introduce a formal model of 
cultural transmission where preferences are shaped by biased individual and social learning 
processes. There is mounting empirical evidence that this applies to status-oriented consumer 
behavior.  Based on interdependent utility functions, spending on status-signaling goods affects 
the reference frames of peers, leading to status races that typically involve self-augmenting cycles 
of resource spending with only a transient positive effect on the agents’ own levels of well-being. 
In this sense, such races can be considered socially wasteful. Recently, policies have been 
proposed, and policy tools devised, that may help steer individual behavior in such a way as to 
align it with the individuals’ own self-interest, as perceived by themselves. This “steering” 
typically involves either the design of incentives (through the taxing of luxury goods, say) or 
attempts by government to intervene in the underlying processes of social norm or preference 
formation. The latter strategy has been referred to as “libertarian” or “asymmetric” paternalism 
(Thaler and Sunstein, 2008; Camerer et al., 2003; Benjamin and Laibson, 2003).4 
                                                 
4 See also Lessig (1995) for examples involving the regulation of informal social norm formation. We leave aside the 
intricate instrumental issue of how policy can effectively shape informal social norms (see Parisi and von 
Wangenheim, 2006). 
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It is in particular proposals of the latter kind that tend to provoke resistance. This is directly 
related to their unclear normative foundations: intuitively, most economists reject the 
paternalistic implications of attempts by government to directly influence processes of norm or 
preference formation (Sugden, 2008; Glaeser, 2006). Interventions of this kind do indeed raise 
thorny normative issues. On which grounds can they (ever) be justified, even when involving 
only minimum degrees of coercion? Due to both the complexity of the normative concepts and 
the magnitude of the social welfare issues involved, the debate is far from being concluded. On a 
deeper level, it cannot be settled without clarifying what exactly is meant by notions such as 
“individual well-being” and “social welfare” in settings where preferences are endogenous and 
potentially inconsistent. This task is made even more demanding in light of the widely shared 
intuition that procedural considerations (involving, e.g., the agents’ “autonomy”) should play a 
role in the assessment of policies and states of affairs. 
The procedural notion of welfare that we suggest is inspired and informed by our formal 
model of cultural learning. We assume that interacting boundedly rational agents are subject to a 
role model (or indirect) bias and a content-related (direct) bias that make them systematically 
prefer some cultural variants - for example, certain consumption behaviors - over others. These 
preferred behaviors or cultural variants include those displayed by prestigious individuals or 
those suited to signal status via consumption. There is a plethora of evidence for the existence of 
these kinds of biases provided by social psychology, the cognitive sciences, and other disciplines 
(see, e.g., Aronson et al., 2002; Norenzayan and Heine, 2005; Richerson and Boyd, 2005). 
Depending on the relative strengths of these two biases, their interplay can generate self-
augmenting learning dynamics that lead agents away from sustainable and welfare enhancing 
consumption paths and that may ultimately even undermine the learning process itself. This is the 
basis for distinguishing between desirable and undesirable paths of preference change. We 
suggest that desirable preference paths represent what may be labeled “effective preference 
learning” and that this should be the standard of welfare guiding public policy. Hence, policy 
should foster the agents’ chances to engage in effective preference learning by leaving their 
freedom to choose untouched, while at the same time employing “nudges” in order to help agents 
avoid undesirable preference cycles and the concomitant risk of learning failure. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 suggests a set of criteria for assessing whether 
welfare measures can be applied in our context and briefly surveys the existing literature on 
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alternative notions of individual well-being and social welfare, i.e., notions that are in principle 
applicable in a setting where individuals continue to learn new and possibly inconsistent 
preferences over time (instead of sticking to “given” and perfectly “rational” preferences). 
Section 3 presents our formal model of cultural transmission that shows how boundedly rational 
agents acquire consumption norms in a systematically biased way. Section 4 suggests a new 
welfare notion of “effective preference learning” that draws on a key insight of the model. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Welfare with inconsistent and variable preferences 
 
Until quite recently, welfare economics as the study of how to conceptualize, justify, model 
and operationalize normative standards and policy goals had almost vanished from the agenda of 
mainstream economics (Sen, 1987; Atkinson, 2009). As the insights of behavioral and 
evolutionary economics into the complexity of human behavior – giving rise to “non-standard 
models of choice” – are now increasingly acknowledged in the profession, this has changed 
dramatically. For many of these new insights raise important policy problems: is it legitimate to 
contain status races by taxing certain goods? Is it acceptable to “nudge” people toward certain 
(e.g., environment-friendly) behaviors? Should policy promote public information campaigns, 
even if they cannot be strictly neutral with respect to people’s preferences? All these are 
contentious issues. They cannot be answered, however, without a thorough inquiry into the 
underlying concept of welfare. This is a non-trivial task: when individual preferences tend to be 
inconsistent and subject to endogenous change, traditional preference-based notions of welfare 
can no longer be applied (Sugden, 2004; Bernheim, 2009). An agent subject to biased social 
learning processes does not necessarily choose options that enhance her own well-being. 
Economists have to think anew about how to define and conceptualize welfare. 
This is maybe most apparent in the ongoing debate about the normative foundations of 
approaches advocating “libertarian”, “light”, “soft”, “benign” or “asymmetric” (henceforth 
LLSBA) versions of paternalism (see Loewenstein and Haisley, 2008, for a survey). According to 
Thaler and Sunstein (2003), a policy counts as paternalistic “if it is selected with the goal of 
influencing the choices of affected parties in a way that will make those parties better off” (ibid., 
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p. 175).5 But what does “better off” mean, i.e., to what notion of well-being or welfare does it 
refer to? The same problem arises in the context of applying the concept of “asymmetric 
paternalism” proposed by Camerer et al. (2003): they require that the net benefit of any 
paternalistic intervention (such as, e.g., a default rule stimulating increased saving) accruing to 
irrational consumers should outweigh the aggregate costs to rational consumers (ibid., pp. 1212, 
1219-20). As Loewenstein and Haisley (2008) rightly note, “[t]o evaluate costs and benefits … 
once again requires some concept of welfare.” 
 
2.1 A catalog of criteria 
An alternative notion or metric of welfare is thus clearly needed. In order to organize and 
facilitate the search process and restrict the range of possible candidates, four separately 
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions can be suggested that any such notion should satisfy: 
(1) First, the notion of welfare should not be detached from what real-world individuals (i.e. 
those depicted in the behavioral economics literature) are able to care about and effectively do 
care about, according to our best available empirical or experimental evidence. In philosophical 
terms, it should respect the “internalist intuition” (Grüne-Yanoff, 2009). As a consequence, it 
should be broadly and at least indirectly based on the individuals’ own subjective perceptions 
about what makes them better off. 
(2) Second, the notion of welfare has to come to terms with the empirical fact that in many 
contexts relevant for economic policy-making, individual preferences tend to be inconsistent and 
do not perfectly reflect the agent’s well-being or “utility”. Systematic errors are common. Hence, 
there is a gap between, (i), what individuals “actually” prefer and what they choose and, (ii), 
between what they choose and what they either “like” (what makes them subjectively happy) or 
what is “good” for them from some objective standpoint. This dissociation between preference, 
choice and well-being is excluded by definition in standard accounts of welfare that are based on 
the weak axiom of revealed preference (Samuelson, 1948), but it is made explicit as a 
                                                 
5 Dworkin (2010) defines it as “the interference of a state or an individual with another person, against their will, and 
defended or motivated by a claim that the person interfered with will be better off or protected from harm.” 
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background assumption in the mainstream Behavioral Economics literature and in the literature 
on LLSBA paternalism.6 
(3) Third, the notion of welfare should not be based on the assumption that individual 
preferences are fixed and exogenously “given”. Rather, when confronted with a new choice 
situation they either “construct” or “learn” new preferences.7 On a theoretical level, this aspect is 
less explicit in the contributions to LLSBA paternalism, but it clearly underlies the practical 
settings in which the recommended policies are to be applied (consider entering the notorious 
cafeteria in Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). In order to integrate this aspect into a theory of well-
being, either the theory has to define well-being independent of the agent’s preferences, or it has 
to account for (and be able to evaluate) the process through which an agent acquires her 
preferences. To illustrate the latter approach, the process of preference formation may be subject 
to manipulation or indoctrination, which may then be taken to indicate sub-optimality (and 
possibly the need for some kind of intervention). 
(4) Fourth and finally, the notion of welfare should not by itself exclude considerations 
related to the (instrumental or inherent) value of individual freedom or “autonomy”. In the 
literature on LLSBA paternalism, this condition plays an important role at the level of 
instrumental reasoning, where policy tools are being devised that are supposed to respect 
individual autonomy by leaving choice-sets (almost or perfectly) unchanged or by even extending 
them. Incorporating the dimension of autonomy into the welfare calculus has of course been a 
long-standing desideratum in welfare economics (Sen, 1987; Sugden, 2010), but so far it is still 
largely unclear how “autonomy” could be conceptualized. 
 
2.2 Four candidate notions of well-being 
Given this catalog of four requirements, it is possible to assess the four main candidates that 
have so far been suggested in the literature, viz., idealized choice, experienced utility, capability, 
and opportunity. Two preliminary remarks are in order, though. First, in our view, the complexity 
of the task to construe a new and “richer” notion and criterion of welfare calls for the broadening 
of its “informational basis”, i.e., for basing the new concept on an empirically informed (rather 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., the distinction between “decision utility” and “experienced utility” in Kahneman et al. (1997). 
7 Evidence that in many economically relevant situations, agents have difficulty in evaluating the utility derived from 
experiences and in constructing new preferences is provided by Ariely et al. (2006). 
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than purely axiomatic) account of human behavior and learning. Second, for the sake of the 
argument, we will abstract from any deeper discussion of operational difficulties, such as 
measurement problems, for these difficulties concern all accounts of welfare that have so far been 
suggested (including our own). Notice, however, that as scientific progress in the behavioral and 
neurosciences is quite impressive, methodological problems that appear insurmountable at the 
moment may be solvable in the near future. That is why we will stick to conceptual and 
theoretical problems in the following. Representing the four main notions of welfare that have 
been suggested so far, we will now briefly discuss the accounts proposed by by Bernheim and 
Rangel (2009), Kahneman et al. (1997), Sen (1985; 2006) and Sugden (2004; 2006; 2010). 
Among these accounts, Bernheim and Rangel’s (2009)8 sticks most closely to orthodox ideas 
of welfare. While basically retaining the traditional choice-based concept of welfare (hence, 
prima facie, respecting condition 1), they modify it by arguing that inconsistent or “distorted” 
choices should be excluded from the welfare calculus. Hence, only a subset of an agent’s choices 
(read: preference satisfactions) shall be taken to indicate an effective increase in that agent’s 
well-being. This implies that a LLSBA intervention would be deemed legitimate to the extent 
that it corrects for “objective” inconsistencies in agents’ revealed choices. 
In trying to find a basis on which to distinguish between “distorted” and “non-distorted” 
choices, the authors concede that non-choice data (such as evidence from brain scans) will be 
necessary. Assuming that all the necessary data are available, the account suggested by Bernheim 
and Rangel presupposes that those choices that are not affected by, for example, memory failures, 
inability to learn or utility misprediction, are indeed reliable indicators of welfare. In that sense, 
the notion of welfare accommodates the existence of preference inconsistency, hence satisfying 
condition (2). What about condition (3)? Imagine a person who really wishes to pursue a given 
activity. After having thoroughly reflected on it, using perfectly rational information processing 
capacities and all available information on the consequences, she gets what she “truly” wants. 
Does this necessary imply that her welfare level has increased? According to Sen (1987), 
preferences may be shaped by the agent’s circumstances. It may be the case that “the hopelessly 
deprived lack the courage to desire much” (ibid., p. 46). To reduce cognitive dissonance, agents 
may downgrade their aspirations and preferences when confronted with meager opportunity sets. 
Elster (1982) calls this phenomenon “adaptive preference change”. Importantly, adaptation works 
                                                 
8 see also Bernheim (2009). 
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independent of the quality and amount of information that has entered the decision, which 
implies that our condition (3) is violated: the informed choice account of welfare cannot 
adequately cope with the phenomenon of preference variability – at least not with the sub-
phenomenon of adaptive preference change. 
There is a second issue involved here. The idea put forward by Bernheim and Rangel (2009) 
closely relates to a family of welfare accounts suggested three decades ago by, for example, 
Brandt (1979, ch. 6), Griffin (1986, chs. 1-2), and Harsanyi (1982).9 According to Harsanyi 
(1982, p. 55), for instance, an agent’s revealed preferences should enter the social welfare 
calculus only to the extent that they reflect his “true” preferences, these being “the preferences he 
would have if he had all the relevant information, always reasoned with the greatest possible care, 
and were in a state of mind most conducive to rational choice.” In an axiomatic sense, “perfect 
information” boils down to Bernheim and Rangel’s “pruned” choices (see above). That is why 
these ideal preferences may have nothing to do with the actual (“manifest”) preferences that a 
cognitively constrained, real-world agent happens to have learned over time, for example, via 
imperfect channels of cultural transmission (see our model below, Section 3). It is unclear 
whether such a real person would endorse her allegedly “true”, but counterfactual, preferences if 
they were presented to her with the expert hint that she would have them had she had all relevant 
information and had she processed that information in a perfectly rational way. This however 
means that, contrary to first appearances, our “internalism” condition (1) is not satisfied. Closely 
related to this, it is questionable whether an account that, in a world populated by at least some 
irrational agents, necessarily leads to the immediate exclusion of some of the agents’ manifest 
preferences satisfies the “autonomy” condition (4). 
Among these shortcomings, from a methodological perspective at least the violations of 
conditions (3) and (1) are related in the following way: Harsanyi’s “true” preferences are those of 
a perfectly informed and perfectly rational homo economicus. For such an agent, neither Sen’s 
divergence between objective well-being and preference satisfaction (see above) nor a divergence 
between manifest and “true” preferences can possibly occur. This is due to the fact that 
Harsanyi’s account is not based on an empirically informed positive theory of human behavior or 
learning, but rather on the axiomatic account of rational choice embodied in the homo 
                                                 
9 See also Sobel (1994). 
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economicus concept. We stipulate that this is at the heart of this (and Bernheim and Rangel’s) 
account’s shortcomings as a theory of human well-being. 
The hedonic approach, most prominently endorsed by Kahneman et al. (1997),10 replaces the 
axiomatic basis of orthodox welfare economics by an empirically informed foundation. Here, 
welfare is redefined as “experienced utility” which in turn is inferred from self-reported levels of 
hedonic well-being. In this view, LLSBA interventions would be judged legitimate to the extent 
that they correct preferences that systematically lead to suboptimal hedonic outcomes. More 
generally, government is supposed to maximize an empirical hedonic social welfare function or 
at least use happiness data to assess the desirability of alternative social states or trade-offs 
involved in, for example, weighing inflation against unemployment (Di Tella et al., 2001), or 
more mundane matters such as airport noise against money (van Praag and Barsma, 2005). As 
these accounts rely on data on self-reported well-being, they easily satisfy our “internalist” 
condition (1). In the context of the present paper, though, the main advantage of a hedonic 
account of welfare lies in its independence of the choices real-world individuals make. Hence, 
experienced utility can be used to critically evaluate the “rationality” – and, hence, normative 
weight (Ng, 1999) – of alternative preferences, their paths, and choices. For this reason, it can be 
argued that this account satisfies condition (2). If suitably amended, it may also be able to satisfy 
condition (4), for the value of autonomy may well be defined as instrumentally valuable within a 
general hedonic framework. 
The main problem associated with this approach is that reported experienced utility, too, is 
subject to adaptation over time: people tend to adapt their subjective level of hedonic utility to 
both fortunate and unfortunate circumstances (Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999)11. Hence, it 
violates our condition (3): in the presence of adaptation effects, basing public policy solely on a 
happiness metric bears the risk of generating counter-intuitive implications. The issue is closely 
related to the adaptation problem in the context of preference formation, discussed above. As Sen 
(1987, pp. 45-46) puts it, “[t]he hopeless beggar, the precarious landless labourer, the dominated 
housewife … may all take pleasures in small mercies … but it would be ethically deeply 
mistaken to attach a correspondingly small value to the loss of their well-being because of this 
survival strategy”. In a different context, such a metric could imply that a health-impaired 
                                                 
10 See also Ng (2003), Layard (2005), Frey and Stutzer (2002). 
11 The locus classicus is Brickman and Campbell (1971). 
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person’s level of “welfare” would positively depend upon her personal ability to adapt – leading 
to the practical consequence that, for example, a welfare-sensitive legislator or judge would make 
damages owed to this person depend negatively on her ability to adapt. 
Hence, experienced utility does not appear to be an attractive candidate for an alternative 
concept of welfare that could be applied in our context. Let us finally discuss the two objectivist 
approaches to human well-being. They are objectivist in the sense that they define well-being (at 
least partly, as in Sen’s case) independent of the agents’ subjective attitudes or mental states. 
Consider Sen’s capability approach: here, an agent’s well-being depends on what the agent is 
able to achieve. Put differently, it is constituted by the vector of functionings that are effectively 
available to her (Sen, 1980; 1985).12 A functioning is defined, very broadly, as “an achievement 
of a person: what she or he manages to do or be” (Sen, 1980, p. 10). Examples include “being 
adequately nourished”, “having a basic education” or “being able to appear in public without 
shame”. Functionings refer to the use a person makes of the commodities she commands and her 
ability to transform commodities into personal quality of life (Clark, 2006). An agent’s 
capabilities are defined as the set of alternative combinations of functionings that she is able to 
achieve (e.g., the ability to achieve the state of “being adequately nourished”). Sen also refers to 
capabilities as the agent’s “substantive freedoms he or she enjoys to lead the kind of life he or she 
has reason to value” (Sen, 1999, p. 87). In contrast to utility-based notions of welfare, in the 
capability approach an agent’s quality of life does not only depend on the achievements 
(outcomes) which are realized in the end, but also on the extent to which she has the freedom to 
choose among alternative options. Given this account of well-being, social arrangements are then 
supposed to expand people’s capabilities (rather than promote economic growth). Hence, LLSBA 
policies would be legitimate to the extent that they promote the provision of functionings by, e.g., 
restricting behavior that is individually self-defeating in terms of these functionings. 
Turning now to our catalog of four criteria, it is not entirely clear whether the capability 
approach satisfies criterion (1). On the one hand, Sen and other contributors to this strand of 
literature (e.g., Nussbaum, 2000) take great pains to argue that their lists of functionings reflect 
what real-world agents really do care about. Consider the procedural dimension of choice which 
is neglected in standard utility-based accounts of well-being, but which obviously is valued by 
most people. On the other hand, given that this approach is objectivist, the agents’ subjectivist 
                                                 
12 See Clark (2006) for a recent survey of the field. 
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perceptions of their own well-being are discounted (Sugden, 2006). Agents may have a say in 
establishing, by means of public deliberation, the lists of functionings (there is not one “definite” 
list, at least not in Sen’s version of the capability theory), but beyond that “constitutional” stage, 
their well-being is assessed according to an external set of criteria. 
It is also easy to verify that this approach satisfies our criteria (2) and (4): as to (2), 
preference inconsistency does not pose a challenge, since the capability approach does not 
conceptualize well-being in terms of consistent preference-satisfaction. As to (4), autonomy 
considerations are explicitly integrated into this approach (see above). It is less obvious, though, 
whether the capability approach can accommodate preference endogeneity (condition 3). Again, 
the phenomenon of adaptation enters the scene. According to Sen, the relevant list of valuable 
functionings should not exclusively be set up by some scientific armchair theorist; rather, it 
should also depend on the subjective valuations of the agents whose quality of life is to be 
assessed. This gives the theory a partly subjectivist outlook. At the same time, it creates the risk 
that the subjective valuations themselves will be shaped by environmental influences, leading to 
adaptation effects analogous to the ones discussed above for the case of preferences and 
happiness: “personal values are also notoriously subject to influence by accustomed social 
conditions” (Sumner, 1996, p. 66). Hence, in this case it is again the adaptation problem that 
precludes the satisfaction of condition (3).13 
Finally, consider the opportunity criterion of well-being advanced by Robert Sugden in a 
series of recent papers (2004; 2006; 2008). Taking the tendency of empirical preferences to be 
inconsistent as his starting point, Sugden suggests to view and embrace it as a fact of life rather 
than a source of suboptimality (qua inconsistency). He proposes to replace the standard 
preference-satisfaction account of welfare by an alternative notion, defining well-being in terms 
of the opportunity to act on whatever preferences one may turn out to hold in future periods. It is 
not the actual satisfaction of these preferences, but rather the unrestricted opportunity to acquire 
them and to act on them (whether they happen to be consistent or not) that generates well-being. 
All this holds in the domain of preferences for private goods and services. As an underlying 
normative principle of consumer sovereignty, Sugden suggests that the individual has to assume 
responsibility – and bear the consequences – for whatever preferences she may then hold.  
                                                 
13 Notice that this argument presupposes that subjective attitudes are in general susceptible to adaptation effects of 
the kind described. That implies in particular that “feeling” and “critical reasoning” (the process where personal 
valuation is brought to bear) do not differ in this regard, a presumption that Sen (2006, p. 93) objects to. 
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It is as yet unclear to what extent this approach supports any LLSBA intervention. Sugden 
himself argues that in this framework any intervention would directly affect the agent’s 
opportunity set – and, hence, well-being – in a negative way, hence precluding any such policy 
(Sugden 2008).14 On the other hand, LLSBA paternalists argue that most policy measures that 
they propose do leave the agents’ opportunity sets unaffected. It seems that this argument cannot 
be resolved without further clarification on what it means to enjoy and act upon one’s own 
“opportunity set”. For our purposes, suffice it to say that it is at least conceivable that even with 
Sugden’s notion of welfare in place, LLSBA paternalism would not be totally excluded. On the 
conceptual level, Sugden’s approach obviously satisfies our criterion (2): preference 
inconsistency is not an issue here. It also satisfies criterion (3), since it is based on the prediction 
that individual will continue to learn and acquire new preferences, which includes adaptation to 
changing environmental conditions. Given the fact that all competing accounts of welfare failed 
at this point (see above), this is a remarkable achievement. Sugden’s account also reserves a 
special place for autonomy or freedom considerations (witness his responsibility norm), hence 
satisfying criterion (4).  
There is only one problem: this approach violates the internalism criterion (1), and this 
violation is largely due to its neglect of the psychological mechanisms driving preference change. 
For in order to back his normative requirement of responsibility and to provide his approach with 
formal consistency, Sugden has to assume at the outset that agents are willing to endorse any 
preference whatsoever they will acquire in future periods. This does not rule out the possibility 
that preferences will be inconsistent, but it does rule out that in light of this possibility agents will 
wish to engage in prudential self-commitment. This quasi-axiomatic statement is, however, at 
odds with empirical evidence: behavioral economics tells us that individuals who are aware of 
their own cognitive constraints and limitations of willpower, often wish to engage in self-
commitment. This already applies in cases where there are only a limited number of “given” 
preference orders (say, a “cold” and a “hot” one) the agent holds in turn.15 It is even more 
pertinent in the case of expected preference change, when in light of current preferences, the 
agent may wish to restrict the option to satisfy a subset of possible future preferences. Hence, by 
                                                 
14 See also Sugden (2009). 
15 Note, though, that the “hot-cold empathy gap” may make such self-commitment difficult in practice (see Ariely 
and Loewenstein, 2006). 
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overriding this deep-seated wish, Sugden’s approach partly overrides what individuals 
themselves care about, which violates our criterion (1). 
We conclude this brief survey of existing non-standard accounts of well-being by observing 
that all accounts suffer from the lack of empirically informed “positive” foundations, notably 
with respect to the processes or mechanisms involved in preference change. Assuming that 
adaptation effects and the desire to self-commit are essential components of real-world processes 
of preference formation, it is easy to see that the existing non-standard accounts of welfare either 
require the exclusion of the former (Bernheim and Rangel, Kahneman, Sen) or the dismissal of 
the latter (Sugden). 
It seems that in order to get an account of well-being that satisfies our criteria (1)-(4), we 
need to be able to integrate both phenomena. In order to do this, we suggest to follow an intuition 
expressed many years ago by Elster (1982): in a world of preference endogeneity, it does not 
make sense to use outcome or “end-state” notions of welfare. Rather, well-being should be made 
a function of the historical genesis of an individual’s wants (ibid.: 237-38). This implies, first, to 
eschew all criteria discussed above, except Sugden’s. Given the need to take seriously the 
concerns of real-world individuals facing preference endogeneity, it implies, second, to inquire 
into the distinction between “desirable” and “undesirable” ways preferences can develop over 
time. In order to do this, it seems necessary to dwell on an empirically informed model of 
preference change and learning. In this context, preference learning paths are “undesirable” to the 
extent that – due to biased social learning processes – they lead individuals away from those 
states that they themselves would consider to be welfare-enhancing. Such a model will be 
presented in the next Section. On its basis it may then be possible to develop an account of well-
being that distinguishes between “beneficial” and “harmful” (or self-defeating) ways to change 
given preferences and acquire new preferences. 
 
 
3. A model of biased cultural learning of consumption norms 
 
Formal models of cultural evolution analyze how cognitive processes of human agents 
combine with patterns of social interaction on the population level to generate the distributions 
and dynamics of cultural variants, for example, the preferences underlying different consumption 
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behaviors (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981; Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Henrich and Boyd, 
2002; Richerson and Boyd, 2005). We draw on this approach to account for preference learning 
dynamics in a population of heterogeneous consumers. As shown, we are then able to distinguish 
different preference learning trajectories and their corresponding welfare implications. 
Cultural transmission or learning is biased; people tend to acquire some cultural variants 
rather than others. We assume two biases here: a role model bias and a content-related, direct 
bias. First, the choice of a cultural trait can be based on the observable attributes of the 
individuals who exhibit the trait (Richerson and Boyd, 2005, 69; Harrington Jr., 1999). Such a 
model-based bias includes a predisposition to imitate successful or prestigious individuals. In 
general, such an indirect bias results if social learners use the value of a secondary character that 
characterizes a model (e.g., her observable consumption level) to determine the attractiveness of 
that individual as a model for the primary character (e.g., the preference concerning the level of 
consumption one should aspire). Hence, one trait of a role model is taken as an indicator whether 
it is worthwhile to copy another aspect of this individual’s behavior or attitude. Second, 
individuals are more likely to adopt some cultural variants rather than others based on their 
content (Boyd and Richerson, 1985, 135; Richerson and Boyd, 2005, 69). Such a content-based 
or direct bias can result from cognitive structures that cause people to preferentially adopt some 
cultural behavior rather than others (e.g., Cordes, 2005). In general, a cultural transmission rule is 
characterized by direct bias if one behavioral variant, for example, status-signaling consumption 
behavior, is more attractive than others. While the general strive to signal status is partly innate 
and partly learned, the kind of commodity suitable to do so depends to a great degree on the 
cultural environment. A directly biased transmission creates a force that increases the frequency 
of the culturally transmitted variant that is favored by the bias. 
To formally depict some normatively relevant facets of cultural evolution, we draw on a 
model based on a set of recursion equations that first was applied to quantitative genetics (see 
Fisher, 1930; Lande, 1981; Kirkpatrick, 1982) and adapt it to our purposes and the specificities of 
cultural dynamics (for accessible introductions to models of social evolution of this type see 
Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981; Boyd and Richerson, 1985, ch. 8; McElreath and Boyd, 2007, 
ch. 8). We begin with the effects of biased cultural learning on an individual’s preference and 
consumption levels. In a next step, we will then show how these learning dynamics translate into 
consequences on the population level. We consider an individual’s preference level to be 
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cardinally measurable. In principle, a shift to an ordinal scale should not alter the model’s general 
mathematical properties and thus the argument developed here. 
Let 0x  be the measure of a consumer’s initial consumption level and 0p  the measure of this 
individual’s preferred level of consumption. Moreover, we assume that each individual is 
exposed to n  role models’ consumption behaviors ( ni xxx ,...,,...,1 ). To allow the relevance of 
different models (e.g., individuals in different social positions) to differ, we assign different basic 
weights, denoted by i , to them, whereby 1
i
i . Moreover, cultural transmission of 
consumption behaviors is subject to a direct bias, i.e., individuals choose role models by 
comparing their notions of an appropriate level of consumption with the observed consumption 
behaviors of models in the population. We assume that, in the beginning, an individual’s 
preference concerning consumption, 0p , exceeds her initial consumption level given by 0x , i.e., 
the direct bias favors higher consumption levels. This reflects a preference for, for example, 
status-signaling goods and a general human concern about status or relative position in a group. 
This implies that another part of the influence of the i th role model, i.e., beside her basic weight 
i , depends on her revealed consumption level, ix , and the preference level of the observing 
individual, 0p , captured by the function ),( 0pxi . In this context, the preference level affects 
which consumption levels or behaviors an individual finds attractive. The observed consumption 
level, ix , that maximizes )(  is the most attractive one. Role models that exhibit this value will, 
on average, have the greatest influence in the transmission of consumption behaviors. The farther 
ix  is away from 0p , the lower the weight of this role model. Below, we will specify a Gaussian 
form for )(  and clarify this idea. 
In total, the weight of the i th model in the transmission of consumption behaviors is given 
by her basic weight, i , and the direct bias function, )( . The recursion equation that 
determines the level of consumption after cultural transmission, 0x , is 
 
(1) 


 n
i
ii
n
i
iii
px
pxx
x
),(
),(
0
0
0


. 
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The role models’ weights are normalized by the denominator so that Equation (1) gives the 
influence of the i th model relative to the other models encountered by the individual in question. 
To represent the evolution of an individual’s preference level, 0p , which is subject to our 
second, indirect bias, we again assume that the importance of the i th model in cultural 
transmission depends on a basic weight, i , modified by an indirect bias function, ),( 0pxi . As 
in the case of the direct bias, the latter part of the weight of the i th model is a function of her 
consumption behavior, captured by ix , and the observing individual’s preference level, 0p . ip  
denotes the n  models’ preference levels concerning appropriate levels of consumption 
( ni ppp ,...,,...,1 ). Then, the individual’s preference level after cultural transmission is given by 
 
(2) 


 n
i
ii
n
i
iii
px
pxp
p
),(
),(
0
0
0


. 
 
Here, social learners are indirectly biased: they use the value of a secondary character that 
characterizes a model – the observed consumption behavior – to determine the attractiveness of 
that individual as a model for the primary character – the preference concerning a certain 
consumption level or behavior. Therefore, in determining their own preference level, consumers 
acquire beliefs from their influential role models about who should be imitated, i.e., about which 
consumption level one should strive for. In addition, the most influential agents – those 
characterized by a level of consumption close to the preference level of the individual in question 
– will prefer higher consumption levels than the population as a whole. We assume an 
individual’s level of consumption to be positively correlated with her preference level. Via 
cultural transmission, agents adopt from their set of role models a higher preference level than 
they had before entailing a higher aspired consumption level. Furthermore, two individuals 
exposed to the same set of cultural models will, on average, adopt different cultural variants of 
traits affected by the role model bias. 
After having defined the recursions that describe how individuals choose their consumption 
level and how they attain their preferences for a certain consumption level via cultural 
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transmission, we now turn to the evolution of the mean values of ix , x , and ip , p , in a 
population consisting of individuals behaving in the described way. To do so, we look at the 
changes in these mean values given by the following expressions: 
 
(3) 

 


 n
i
i
n
i
n
i
iii xx
xxx
)(
)()(


 
and 
(4) 

 


 n
i
i
n
i
n
i
iii pp
ppp
)(
)()(


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As is shown in the Appendix A (see also Price, 1970), (3) and (4) can be reformulated to 
 
(5) 

 )),(,cov( pxxx   
and 
(6) 

 )),(,cov( pxpp  . 
 
For values of x  and p  close to x  and p , the bias functions )(  and )(  can be 
approximated by using a Taylor series approximation (see Appendix B). We then obtain for the 
changes in the mean values of x  and p  
 
(7) 
pxpx p
px
x
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,,
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

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In this context, ),cov( px  indicates the covariance between a certain level of consumption, 
measured by x , and the preference level, p , that determines the consumption level perceived as 
appropriate by a consumer. This is the assumed positive correlation between an individual’s 
consumption level x  and her notions about an “adequate” level of consumption, p . The other 
term, beginning with )var(x  or )var(p , gives the change due to the direct effect of variation in 
that variable, for example, how a change in an individual’s consumption level affects her 
influence as a role model. In order to facilitate an evaluation of this two-dimensional system, we 
need to define particular functional forms for the direct and indirect bias expressions. Plausible 
forms of )(  and )(  are Gaussian bias functions 
 
(9)  2)(exp),( pxapx   
and 
(10)  2)(exp),( pxbpx   
 
where the parameter a  measures the strength of the direct bias, and the parameter b  measures 
the strength of the indirect bias. Both forces are subject to genetic dispositions and an 
individual’s idiosyncratic learning history (see, e.g., Richerson and Boyd, 2005, p. 66). These 
two functions measure the influence of role models in cultural transmission as a function of their 
exhibited consumption levels. This influence is maximized for px   and decreases the farther x  
is away from p . Given these assumptions and letting xG  and pG  indicate the variance in x  and 
p  respectively, while xpB  indicates the constant covariance between x  and p , the recursions for 
the two means are16 
 
(11)    xapaBpaxaGx xpx 2222   
and 
(12)    xbpbGpbxbBp pxp 2222  . 
 
                                                 
16 Like most modelers using this kind of formal approach, we assume that the variance evolves to its equilibrium 
value independent of changes in the mean and is constant thereafter (see, e.g., McElreath and Boyd, 2007, p. 302). 
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Next, we solve for xˆ  and pˆ  denoting the equilibrium values of the consumption and the 
preference levels in a population of interacting consumers. It is easy to see that if px  , both 
recursion equations equal zero. Therefore, px ˆˆ   is an equilibrium of this two-dimensional 
dynamic system. Given a graph with x  on the horizontal axis and p  on the vertical axis, px   
is a line through the origin with slope one and any point on this line is an equilibrium. To further 
analyze the model’s dynamic properties, it is helpful to compute its trajectory in such a diagram: 
 
(13) 
)22()22(
)22()22(
xapaBpaxaG
xbpbGpbxbB
x
p
xpx
pxp

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If x  changes one unit as a result of biased cultural transmission, the preference level, p , changes 
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 units as a consequence of the correlated effects. 
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Figure 1 The phase plots of the model’s evolutionary learning trajectories for (a) a>b  
and (b) a<b (Bxp=3, Gx=1, Gp=1). 
 
Figure 1 shows two phase plots of the model’s evolutionary trajectories that visualize its 
dynamics. In both cases, the dashed 45-degree lines through the origins with slope one are the 
lines of equilibrium, where px  . Both, x  and p  increase above this line of equilibrium and 
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decrease below it. The other lines in Figure 1 (a) and (b) give the trajectories of populations of 
social learners that begin at different initial points and have slope 
)(
)(
xxp
pxp
GBa
GBb


. Given the case 
depicted in (a), the slope of the trajectory is less than the slope of the line of equilibrium and the 
system is stable approaching an equilibrium on the 45-degree line, as is indicated by the arrows. 
On the other hand, in case (b), if the trajectory’s slope is greater, the population evolves towards 
higher and higher preference levels and respective consumption levels when starting from a point 
above the line of equilibrium. 
Therefore, if )()( pxpxxp GBbGBa  , i.e., if the direct bias, whose strength is measured by 
the parameter a , is larger than the indirect bias effect, measured by b , then the learning dynamic 
eventually comes to rest at some point along the line of equilibrium. This situation is depicted in 
Figure 1 (a). On the other hand, if the indirect bias effect of role models is greater, i.e., if 
)()( xxppxp GBaGBb  , then the mean of the preference level in the population, p , is 
increasing faster than the mean of the consumption level, measured by x , and both traits “run 
away”; the system is unstable (case (b) in Figure 1 for initial values lying above the line of 
equilibrium). As a consequence, the distance of both mean values from the line of equilibrium is 
increasing from one learning step to the next ( xpxp  ). Certainly, this process cannot 
continue forever: some economic or ecological constraints will eventually restrain this dynamic. 
Some factors not accounted for in the model will eventually limit the evolution of the cultural 
traits in the population. To conclude, a situation with xp   (inducing a rise in x ) combined with 
the role model bias function, )( , that continuously updates the preference levels upward, 
makes social learners adopt ever more accentuated preferences relative to an “appropriate” level 
of consumption. This results in a self-augmenting “treadmill” of consumption choices. 
Figure 2 offers another way to visualize the system’s dynamic properties. It displays the 
development of a representative individual’s preference level, 0p , and consumption level, 0x , by 
iterating the two-dimensional system consisting of Equations (11) and (12) for many social 
learning steps. As can be seen in Figure 2 (a), the role model bias in social learning gives rise to a 
widening gap between an individual’s preference and consumption levels. This might also be 
interpreted as a growing discontent of an agent with her material condition. Figure 2 (b), in 
contrast, assumes that no role model bias continuously updates a consumer’s preference level. In 
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this case, an individual’s level of consumption finally reaches her preference level. The closing of 
this gap might entail a lasting satisfaction of this consumer’s preferences. 
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Figure 2 (a) The development of an 
individual’s preference and consumption 
levels when indirect bias is greater than 
direct bias. 
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Figure 2 (b) The development of an 
individual’s preference and consumption 
levels when there is no indirect bias. 
 
 
To summarize our findings derived from the model, we offer the following propositions. 
Proposition 1: If the preference level of an individual consumer were unaffected by indirectly 
biased social learning processes, following from Equation (11), x  would be at equilibrium at 
unbiasedpx  . Thus, if unbiasedpx   the mean value of a population’s consumption level would 
increase; if it is greater than unbiasedp , it would decrease. 
Proposition 2: If consumers’ mean consumption level, measured by x , reaches their mean 
preference level, p , they temporarily meet their corresponding needs. This state is, however, 
of a transitory nature only if p  is continuously modified by processes of biased social 
learning via cultural role models. The individuals then feel deprived again and strive to adapt 
their consumption level to this new preference level determining the new level of 
consumption perceived as appropriate. However, the additional resources spend on reaching 
the new consumption level still only lead to satisfying one’s (modified) consumption 
preference as it did on lower levels of consumption. 
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4. Towards a procedural concept of well-being 
 
This Section presents an account of well-being that builds upon the insights on processes of 
cultural learning and preference formation discussed above. The model of cultural transmission 
informs us about the conditions under which the dynamic interplay of two learning biases can 
generate a treadmill of self-augmenting consumption cycles. This allows us to draw a line 
between those learning paths that are in dynamic equilibrium and those paths that depart from 
this equilibrium in an accelerating way, leading the agent into an extreme state of permanent 
dissatisfaction where, ultimately, exogenous (economic or ecological) constraints become 
binding and the latent learning dynamics cannot unfold anymore. 
We suggest to use this model for normative purposes in the following way: processes of 
preference learning can either “work” or “fail to work” effectively. In the former case, the 
representative agent’s gradual updating of her preference level (recall that this is a cardinal 
variable) settles down in a dynamic equilibrium that allows her to satisfy her preferences by 
matching her preference path with a corresponding consumption path (again, note that her 
consumption level, at any point in time, is represented by some cardinal variable). This is the 
process depicted in Figure 1(a). In the latter case, the agent continuously modifies her preference 
levels in such a way that she systematically fails to successfully satisfy her preference level (and, 
hence, fails to increase her well-being). If we interpret preferences as instrumental tools that 
should ideally enhance the agent’s well-being, we may say that the agent, driven by the interplay 
of our two biases, ends up systematically acquiring dysfunctional tools (as shown in Figure 2(a)). 
Our model of cultural transmission allows us to operationalize Elster’s intuitive idea that in a 
world of preference endogeneity we should inquire into the historical genesis of the agents’ 
preferences (see Section 2, above) in order to be able to distinguish between desirable and 
undesirable ways of preference learning. In Elster’s original paper, he mentions “adaptive 
preference formation” and the “deliberative manipulation of wants by other people” as cases of 
undesirable preference change (1982, p. 223, pp. 226-230). In his account, the label “undesirable” 
refers to the presumed lack of “autonomy” in the acquisition of preferences. In contrast, we focus 
on an empirically particularly relevant case of social conditioning that involves our specific two 
biases. The model can be used to track the genesis of an agent’s preferences by identifying the 
way these biases interact in driving the agent’s process of preference formation. Based on the 
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empirically observed differential impact of these two biases, it is then possible to suggest a 
normative distinction between two kinds of preference dynamics. 
This distinction can be made normatively relevant by suggesting the following notion of 
individual well-being: rather than being defined as the satisfaction of “given” and perfectly 
consistent preferences, in our setting well-being should be understood as the ability to engage in 
the effective learning of new preferences over time, with the “effective” proviso reflecting the 
absence of systematical frustration on the part of the agent. “Frustration” is to be understood in 
terms of our model of cultural learning, as the systematic non-satisfaction of preferences, due to 
the ongoing process of preference updating, fuelled by the influence of social role models, in 
combination with a consumption level that does not grow at the same pace. Consequently, 
although the individual’s level of consumption rises, her preferences are not satisfied, since the 
agent is “never satisfied” with what she is able to attain. The effective learning of new 
preferences constitutes well-being in a partly procedural sense. It is partly inherently valuable, 
i.e., independent of the outcomes in terms of preference satisfaction, and its value is independent 
of the logical consistency of an agent’s vector of preferences at any given point in time. 
Endogenous preferences turn out to be naturally inconsistent, so in our view it does not make 
sense to treat inconsistency as an argument for discounting the value of an agent’s preferences.17 
In light of this notion of well-being, status-oriented consumption qualifies as a policy 
problem to the extent that it generates learning dynamics that ultimately (and, perhaps, 
paradoxically) jeopardize the individuals’ ability to “try out” new preferences in an ongoing, 
sustainable way. At the level of instrumental policy-making, it follows that policy should at least 
not restrict, but preferably foster the ability of individuals to engage in the effective learning of 
new preferences. In order to achieve this, it seems that two general conditions have to be met: 
first, agents should obviously be left free to acquire new preferences as they see fit. They should, 
then, be endowed with the maximum set of opportunities that is compatible with everyone else’s 
opportunity set. Note that this first condition is identical to Sugden’s criterion of well-being as 
“opportunity” (see above). In our framework, it is however not sufficient: our model of cultural 
transmission predicts that preference formation may be dynamically unstable under certain 
circumstances. These circumstances are targeted by our second condition: policy should design 
the institutional framework of markets in such a way that the tendency of preference dynamics to 
                                                 
17 See Sugden (2004) for a related argument. 
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“collapse” by inducing self-augmenting cycles will at least not be promoted, but preferably 
reduced. Prima facie, this may be achieved by a variety of tools that either involve “hard” 
paternalism (involving taxation of status goods, say) or milder LLSBA interventions that aim 
directly at influencing consumers’ preferences. 
How can our notion of well-being be justified? We propose to follow Sugden (2008) in 
adopting a contractarian perspective that frames the issue of evaluating alternative policy rules in 
terms of a mutual “constitutional” agreement between the individuals that will be affected by the 
rules. In order to operationalize this approach, assume that all those individuals are put behind a 
Rawlsian “veil of ignorance” where they do not know anything about the preferences they 
themselves will adopt in the future “market game” with their periods of cultural transmission.18 
Assume furthermore that they do know about the characteristics of the model of cultural learning 
introduced in Section 3, above, i.e., they know about the conditions that may undermine the 
ongoing learning of new preferences and “trap” them in self-defeating cycles of status 
consumption. Given these assumptions, we claim that those individuals may agree upon assessing 
alternative policy rules in light of our notion of well-being. This claim would be refuted if 
individuals would, through a process of public deliberation, reject the idea to guide and structure 
policy with the help of such a notion.19  
This claim is backed by the following proposition: Our notion of well-being satisfies all the 
criteria that have been posited in Section 2, above: First, it is not detached from what real-world 
individuals are able to care about and effectively do care about. Being an essential contributing 
factor to an individual’s identity and sense of self, preference learning (and the ability to pursue 
it) can be argued to be even one of the most important things in life people care about. Hence, we 
argue that our concept of well-being satisfies the “internalism” condition (1). 
Second, our notion of well-being allows for individual preferences to be inconsistent and 
departing from what is in the agent’s “best interests”. In our context, this means that under certain 
circumstances the agent may willingly acquire preferences that are self-defeating from an ex post 
perspective. The possible dissociation between preference, choice and well-being is build into our 
approach to reasoning about well-being. That is why condition (2) is satisfied. 
                                                 
18 See Witt and Schubert (2008) for a related approach. 
19 This is the usual way to frame the role of normative arguments in contractarian theory, see, e.g., Vanberg (2006). 
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Third, our notion of well-being is explicitly tailored to a world where preferences are not 
“given” once and for all, but change endogenously. Specifically, they are subject to “natural” 
processes of social conditioning, which in our model come in the shape of two kinds of biases 
and their dynamic interplay. In this context, the main advantage of our concept of well-being lies 
in its procedural nature which reflects the procedural account of preferences supported by our 
positive background model. Hence, condition (3) is satisfied. 
Fourth, by virtue of requiring to give agents maximum opportunities to engage in preference 
learning (subject only to freedom-preserving LLSBA interventions to prevent “traps” in the 
dynamics of preference learning, see above), our notion of well-being includes considerations 
related to the instrumental and/or inherent value of individual freedom and autonomy. This 
allows us to conclude that condition (4) is satisfied as well. 
At a more applied level, our procedural notion of well-being (with its positive background 
model of cultural learning) may be used to assess the desirability of the usually proposed sets of 
policy tools to shape people’s consumption of status goods. Consider “hard” paternalism first. 
Contrary to a widely shared view in the literature on conspicuous consumption and “positional 
externalities” (Frank, 2008), our model shows that the taxation of status goods is ineffective in 
reducing the consumption of status-signaling goods and the accompanying participation in 
“status races”. Recall the key relationship between x  and p  (Figure 1, above). If px  , a tax 
imposed on the consumption of the good in question would merely increase the difference 
between x  and p  without removing the consumers’ general motivation to meet their preference 
level by increasing their personal consumption levels and, thus, finally x . The role model-based 
acquisition of modified preference levels via social learning remains unaffected. In the case of 
taxation, “status races” would still take place by means now affordable within the boundaries of 
the new economic restrictions. Hence, this kind of consumption dynamic may occur on the basis 
of rather different classes of commodities depending on the available income. The deeper 
motivational factors driving status-seeking would remain unaffected. 
Hence, interventions that target processes of preference and social norm formation appear to 
be the best (and probably only) tools available to counter self-defeating preference dynamics. We 
will briefly consider two kinds of policies that shape preference formation (the proper realm of 
LLSBA paternalism), two kinds of policies that shape social norm formation by targeting the 
“social meaning” of activities (Lessig, 1995), and finally the design of institutional frameworks 
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that satisfy the individuals’ need for self-esteem by providing procedural utility (Frey et al., 
2004). 
As to the first set of policies, we suggest two kinds of interventions. First, policy may 
influence agents’ preferences by providing information about the characteristics and “side-
effects” of consumer goods that will not be provided in the marketplace. This information 
provision may proceed on more or less neutral terms, i.e. involve the “coloring” of information 
by using framing effects or other tricks from the behavioral economics toolbox. Our criterion of 
well-being would endorse the non-neutral provision of information as long as agents are not 
made subject to manipulation “behind their back”, i.e., as long as they can in principle (i.e., if 
they explicitly wish to do so) realize the degree of non-neutrality and act against the policy-
maker’s goals.20 
Second, given that, (i), an important precondition of status consumption and the ensuing 
status races is the individuals’ ability to incur debt and that, (ii), widespread overborrowing is a 
key effect of people’s participation in status races, we argue that LLSBA instruments should be 
used to discourage people from behavior that leads to excessive indebtedness. There is ample 
empirical evidence that the manipulation of default options can effectively influence people’s 
attitudes towards saving and dissaving (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008).  
As to the second set of policies, targeting processes of social norm formation, we again 
suggest two specific interventions. They aim at influencing the “social meaning” of activities, 
which Lessig (1995, p. 951) defines as the locally uncontested “semiotic content attached to 
various actions, or inactions, or statuses, within a particular context”. They are derived from 
socially shared understandings or expectations concerning the appropriate course of action in 
specific situations. To illustrate, consider “what it means” to be black in the American South in 
the 1960s, to have a whisky in the office in the early 1960s, to have the same whisky in the office 
in today’s business world, or to smoke as a woman in the early 20th century. Within limits, policy 
may use the conservation or manipulation of social meanings to achieve certain aims, such as the 
aim to discourage status-oriented consumption. First, it may regulate advertisement by banning 
the direct appeal to people’s role-model bias in the media. Second, it may exploit the very same 
role model bias by promoting public campaigns that associate prestigious (prominent and 
                                                 
20 See Bovens (2008) for a similar suggestion. 
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glamorous) role models with an attitude that is immune against the lure of status good 
consumption (by appealing to people’s “autonomy” or “self-determination”, say).  
Finally, a third set of policies could be implemented to confront directly one of the key 
motivational drivers of status good consumption, namely people’s needs for self-esteem, respect, 
and a positive self-image (e.g. Johansson-Stenman and Martinsson, 2006). Happiness research 
tells us that the very same set of needs can also be satisfied by organizing human relationships 
within the political arena or at the workplace in such a way that people gain “procedural utility” 
(Frey et al., 2004). This may be a supplementary step towards reducing individuals’ desire to 
satisfy these needs through expensive status good consumption, hence to decrease the demand for 
status good consumption, the engagement in “wasteful” status races, and the risk of decreasing 
individuals’ well-being in terms of their ability to self-improve by learning new preferences. 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
While behavioral economics provides ample evidence for the fact that in many economically 
relevant situations real-world individuals may systematically fail to choose what is in their best 
interests (as perceived by themselves), little progress has been made to derive convincing policy 
implications from this. We have argued that this is due to the fact that we cannot formulate policy 
advice without a concept of well-being or welfare, and that the policy-minded literature in the 
field still lacks a concept of well-being which could be consistently applied in a “behavioral” 
setting, i.e., in a setting where individual preferences change and tend to be inconsistent.  
Our contribution to the literature has been twofold. First, we have tried to facilitate the quest 
for a “behaviorally adequate” non-standard concept of well-being by introducing a catalog of four 
conditions that any such concept ought to satisfy. We have used this catalog to gauge the 
usefulness of those (four) non-standard notions of well-being that have so far been discussed in 
the literature. In our view, this exercise already sheds light on the contours of a practically 
applicable concept (for instance, it tells us that such a concept will certainly be of a procedural 
nature). Second, following the intuition that additional insights into the process of individual 
preference formation may shed further light on this issue, we have introduced a formal model of 
preference learning. The model predicts that the interplay of two specific biases can generate self-
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augmenting learning dynamics that lead agents away from sustainable and welfare-enhancing 
consumption paths. This prediction allowed us to make a distinction between “desirable” and 
“undesirable” paths of preference learning. This distinction is, thus, not axiomatic, but grounded 
in empirical evidence, and it can form the basis of a procedural notion of well-being. According 
to this view, well-being is seen as residing in the individual’s ability to engage in the ongoing, 
not systematically frustrated ability to acquire new preferences. Hence, status races call for policy 
intervention to the extent that they risk decreasing well-being, thus defined. We hasten to add an 
important caveat: this policy intervention should not be organized in a top-down way, by some 
omniscient social planner. Rather, we have suggested to frame the discussion in terms of the 
contractarian paradigm: our concept of well-being should be used to inform the individuals 
themselves (as citizens) about possible ways to think about the problem of status races and their 
impact on well-being. On the basis of this information, the individuals may agree upon a social 
contract, stipulating a set of rules that help them avoid the welfare losses associated with status 
races, while essentially maintaining their personal freedom of choice. Think of it as the analog of 
a set of traffic rules: they do not prescribe any particular activity (they don’t tell you where to 
go), but they channel interdependent – and potentially harmful – individual behavior in such a 
way that harmful accidents are avoided as far as possible. 
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